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We develop an empirical method to assess the generosity of employer-sponsored insurance across
groups within the U.S. population.  A key feature of this method is its simplicity – it only requires
data on out-of-pocket (OOP) health care spending and total health care spending and does not require
detailed knowledge of health insurance benefit design.  We apply our method to assess whether households
with a chronically ill member have more or less generous insurance relative to households with no
chronically ill members. We find that the chronically ill have less generous insurance coverage than
the non-chronically ill. Additional analyses suggest that the reason for this less generous coverage
is not that households with a chronically ill member are in different, less generous plans, on average.
Rather, households with a chronically ill member have higher spending on certain types of medical
services (e.g., pharmaceutical drugs) that are covered less generously by insurance.  Given recent work
on value-based insurance design and coinsurance as an obstacle to medication adherence, our findings
suggest that the current design of health plans may put the health and financial well-being of the chronically
ill at risk.
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Introduction 
While employer-sponsored health insurance is frequently viewed as the “gold 
standard” with respect to the financial protection that it provides to policyholders and 
their dependents, some of that protection has been eroded in recent years as employers 
seek ways to slow dramatic increases in premiums.  Many employers have responded to 
rising costs by offering plans that include higher cost-sharing requirements in the form of 
deductibles and coinsurance, as well as higher out-of-pocket (OOP) premium 
requirements for employees taking up coverage (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010).  Plans 
have also introduced greater variation in coinsurance and copayments for different 
services or products.  Examples include different cost-sharing for specialist versus 
generalist visits, or for different tiers of products, such as brand versus generic drugs.  
These changes are designed in some cases to provide incentives for consumers to choose 
lower cost options and, in other cases, simply to shift costs to those who utilize these 
services and thereby lower premiums. 
These incremental changes in benefit design are likely to affect particular 
enrollees differently, not only because of different choices made in response to new 
incentives but also because individuals with different health care needs may require a 
different mix of services.  For example, greater use of copayments relative to deductibles 
may shift OOP costs toward patients with recurring services, such as those with chronic 
conditions, and away from patients with acute conditions, even if total expenditures for 
the two patients are equal.   
Additionally, it is not at all clear that the incentives of employers and insurers 
would ensure that such inequities are providing greater efficiency.  For example, there is   3
ample evidence that higher cost-sharing on prescription drugs lowers the probability of 
adherence to treatment (Leibowitz et.al. 1985, Karaca-Mandic et al. 2011; Joyce et al. 
2002; Goldman et al. 2004; Goldman et al. 2006).  There is also a growing body of 
literature suggesting that any health care cost savings generated by lower medication 
adherence may be offset, and in some cases even more than offset, by higher spending on 
other services such as inpatient and outpatient care (Chandra et. al. 2010, Gaynor et. al. 
2007, Goldman et. al. 2006).  Patients with chronic conditions are among the most likely 
to experience adverse and expensive health events after failing to adhere to a medication 
program. 
The ways in which benefit design affects different types of patients is also 
particularly important at this juncture since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010 authorizes the development of an essential benefits package and allows for 
value-based insurance designs.  The specific features of benefit packages should take into 
account how alternative designs may differentially affect enrollees requiring different 
types of services, such that costs are not inadvertently shifted without corresponding 
efficiency gains.   
Despite its importance, analysis of the coverage provisions of health plans and 
their potential impact on different types of enrollees is made difficult by a lack of current, 
nationally representative data that includes detailed information on benefit design 
features and enrollees’ medical care consumption. This type of information would permit 
analysis of differences in, for example, copayments for different types of services or 
different types of prescription drugs.  Given the lack of nationally representative data on 
enrollees’ benefit design attributes, we propose an alternative method for measuring   4
insurance generosity that also permits the identification of differences in coverage 
generosity experienced by different populations.  Using the nationally representative 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component for 1997-2007, we examine 
how OOP medical spending varies across the distribution of total medical spending for 
various populations. By holding constant total spending, we are able to assess whether 
insurance coverage is less generous on average across various populations, rather than 
simply capturing differences in the distribution of total spending for these populations.  
To illustrate the differences, we determine the relationship between OOP and total 
spending using both non-parametric and parametric methods.  Our method approximates 
a benefit design approach which explicitly compares plan features for analyzing 
generosity but with far fewer data requirements.  In its simplest form, our method 
requires only data on total and OOP spending incurred by enrollees. 
We apply our approach to make comparisons in coverage generosity between the 
population with chronic illness and the non-chronically ill.  This is a particularly salient 
comparison for several reasons.  First, the proportion of the population with a chronic 
condition has been growing rapidly.  In 2005, about 60 percent of the adult U.S. civilian 
non-institutionalized population had at least one chronic condition.  As the population 
ages, it is expected that chronic condition prevalence will also rise, given the positive 
association between disease onset and age (Machlin, Cohen, and Beauregard, 2008).  
Second, on the surface, it appears that some of the more frequent design changes to 
insurance plans, such as use of multiple cost-sharing tiers for prescription drugs, may 
differentially affect those with chronic conditions.  And, third, there is evidence from   5
research on value-based design that treatments for chronic conditions are of particularly 
high value (Fendick et al. 2009, Chernew et. al. 2008, Choudhry, et. al. 2007). 
 Our results suggest that that the chronically ill have less generous coverage on 
average than the non-chronically ill, controlling for total healthcare spending.  To 
understand what drives these differences, we examine the other characteristics of the 
health insurance benefits held by these groups in order to test whether the differences that 
we observe are due to these two populations being insured by different types of plans.  
We do not find evidence that the two groups are in different types of health plans.  
However, we do document significant differences in the type of services used by the 
chronically ill – most notably, prescription drugs. We also find that the type of services 
used more frequently by the chronically ill have higher shares of OOP to total spending,  
on average, than those more frequently used by households without chronic conditions.  
We conclude with a discussion of the possible implications of benefit designs that are less 
generous with respect to the services consumed by the chronically ill. 
Previous Literature on Insurance Generosity 
A number of previous studies have examined concepts related to insurance 
generosity or to underinsurance and have proposed a variety of methods to measure these 
concepts.  Our intent is to capture a different notion of generosity than prior work but it is 
helpful to define and contrast these related measures.  Two common measures related to 
the concept of generosity used in the literature are a household-level underinsurance 
threshold measure and a plan’s actuarial value.  Being underinsured is often defined in 
the literature as a household having out-of-pocket medical spending greater than 10% of   6
household income.  This measure highlights the burden of health care spending by 
controlling for household income.  Underinsurance rates for the population are useful for 
obtaining an overall picture of the degree of financial protection that health insurance is 
providing relative to income.  See for example, Short and Banthin (1995), Banthin and 
Bernard (2006), Banthin et al. (2008), and Schoen et al. (2008), Cunningham (2010) and 
a discussion and critique of this measure in Abraham et al. (2010).  
Actuarial values, on the other hand, are measured for specific health plans, not for 
individual households. The actuarial value of a plan is the average proportion of medical 
expenditures paid by the plan for a standard population (Peterson, 2009).  Although it is 
possible to calculate separate actuarial values for particular groups of enrollees within a 
population, this is rarely done, most likely because the intended purpose is usually to rank 
health plans rather than the experiences of specific enrollee populations of those plans.  
Also, the data requirements for calculating actuarial values are quite high since detailed 
data on benefit designs and spending among individuals within a population are 
necessary (McDevitt, 2008).  See for example, Gabel et al. (2006), Gabel et al. (2007), 
and McDevitt (2010). 
Conceptual Framework 
Our objective is to measure how insurance generosity compares for different 
groups.  In the application in this paper, we compare households with and without a 
member with a serious chronic condition.  Neither the use of threshold measures of 
underinsurance nor actuarial values would enable us to understand how populations with 
different health care needs may be differentially affected by insurance benefit designs.    7
The key to our approach of comparing insurance generosity between groups is to control 
for total medical spending.  
To illustrate the importance of controlling for total spending, consider two single 
person households – one with a high level of expenditures and one with no expenditures 
– who are otherwise identical and are enrolled in the same insurance plan.  The household 
with high expenditures could well be considered “underinsured” using a threshold 
measure.  One would not suggest on the basis of this evidence, however, that one 
household had generous insurance while the other had “stingy” insurance, since the two 
households are not comparable in terms of spending.  If the household with no 
expenditures had required healthcare, we do not know whether its OOP would have been 
higher, lower, or the same as that of the other household.  Thus, while related to the 
concept of generosity, the underinsurance measure will not capture generosity in the way 
we intend.   
Now again consider two otherwise identical single person households with the 
same insurance plan.  One household incurs $10,000 of expenditure because of a 
hospitalization from an accident while the other incurs $10,000 of expenditure because 
the individual is required to take a relatively expensive pharmaceutical due to a chronic 
condition.  If there is no cost-sharing associated with hospitalization, but a 20 percent 
coinsurance rate associated with drug spending, these two causes of spending – an 
accident versus a chronic condition – would not be insured to the same degree.  We 
characterize the individual with the chronic illness in this example as less generously 
insured because he has a higher OOP cost for the same level of total spending.  The 
underinsurance measure would not distinguish between these two situations unless the   8
OOP spending of the chronically ill individual exceeded the threshold level (as a 
percentage of income) so as to be categorized as underinsured.  The plan-level actuarial 
value also would not distinguish between the two individuals because we have assumed 
the two held the same plan.  These other measures capture different notions of generosity 
than is our intent. 
Moving to comparing populations rather than individual households, we consider 
an analogous definition for insurance generosity.  Once again, the key is to control for 
total spending.  For example, we would consider those with chronic illness to be less 
generously insured if their OOP spending is, on average, higher than the OOP spending 
of the non-chronically ill after controlling for total spending.  This could occur if, as in 
the example above, the types of treatments received by the chronically ill tend to have 
higher coinsurance rates associated with them than the types of treatments received by 
the non-chronically ill.  In the example above, we assumed that the two individuals were 
enrolled in the same plan.  When comparing two populations, however, we could also 
find differences in the share of expenses paid OOP for a given level of total spending if 
the two groups enroll in different plans and if those plans differ in deductible, 
coinsurance rates, services covered, maximum out-of-pocket spending, or in other 
dimensions. 
Our approach to measuring the generosity of insurance is to estimate insurance 
curves, which neatly summarize differences in complex sets of benefits for enrollees. 
What we refer to as a “health insurance curve” plots the relationship between total 
spending (on the x-axis) and OOP spending (on the y-axis).  Examining insurance curves 
is a useful way to empirically summarize the average plan characteristics held by a   9
population.  This is especially useful when detailed plan characteristics are not available, 
but when OOP and total spending are available.   For example, in the MEPS Household 
Component (HC), detailed benefit design information is not known but total and OOP 
spending are available.
2 
  Our approach is particularly useful in that it allows us to aggregate across plans 
for a population. Insurance plans are often quite complex in their design.  For example, 
there are often different deductibles for individuals within a family plan and the family as 
a whole.  Different treatments may have different co-insurance rates (for example, 
inpatient care may have a lower co-insurance rate than outpatient and different 
prescription drugs may have different “tiers” of coverage).  Finally, some services may 
not be covered at all, for example, out-of-network treatments.  Given this level of detail, 
summarizing the average or typical plan characteristics across groups would be 
challenging; however, our method provides a simple way to do this. 
Empirical Strategy 
Data: 
We use data from the 1997-2007 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
Household Component (HC), sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality.  The Household Component contains individual and household-level information 
on demographics, medical conditions, income, and employment.  Respondents also 
provide information regarding health insurance throughout the year, medical care 
utilization by service type, and expenditures by source of payment. The MEPS includes 
                                                 
2 The exception to this is the 1996 MEPS-HC when health insurance benefits booklets were abstracted.    10
five rounds of survey interviews and collects information covering a two-year time 
period. 
Our unit of analysis is a household, defined in the MEPS as a Health Insurance 
Eligibility Unit.   An HIEU is a sub-family relationship unit constructed to include adults 
plus those family members who would typically be eligible for coverage under private 
family plans, including spouses, unmarried natural or adopted children who are age 18 or 
under, and children under age 24 who are full-time students.   We use the household as 
the unit of analysis, rather than the individual, since individuals within a household 
typically share resources to cover expenses associated with medical care and health 
insurance, and because employer sponsored insurance can be conferred on all members 
of a household through taking up family coverage.    
Our study population is restricted to households in which all members are under 
65 years of age, since almost all individuals who turn 65 become eligible for Medicare.   
We also restrict the analysis to households in which all members are continuously insured 
by employer sponsored insurance during the calendar year.  When household members 
experience coverage gaps, they are likely to alter their care-seeking behavior and costs in 
response. To avoid introducing this source of heterogeneity into our analysis, we exclude 
any households in which any member had a spell of uninsurance or moved to a public 
insurance plan during the year. The final sample includes 47,183 households, which 
represents approximately 51.4 million U.S. households. 
Measures:   11
Medical Spending: We use information on two types of medical care spending: 
total and out-of-pocket.  We aggregate individual-level spending across household 
members to get household-level, out-of-pocket and total medical care spending.  We then 
inflate the measures to 2009 dollars.  We also have data on households’ total spending, 
and OOP spending by service category, including inpatient hospitalization, office-based 
provider visits, emergency department visits, outpatient, prescription drugs, dental, 
vision, and home health services.  Descriptive analyses revealed large positive outliers in 
the data for both total spending and out-of-pocket spending.  To address this, we first 
trimmed the bottom and top one-half percent of observations based on OOP spending 
values and then removed all observations with total spending in excess of $400,000 or 
OOP spending greater than $30,000 (n=18). 
Chronic Illness: Using the MEPS Medical Conditions file, we extracted 
information on the medical conditions reported by household members. For the purpose 
of selecting which conditions to include, we reviewed published studies of medical care 
spending among those with chronic illness (e.g., Bodenheimer et al. 2009; Banthin and 
Bernard, 2006; Davidoff and Kenney, 2005; Anderson, 2010) to identify prevalent 
conditions most typically classified as “chronic.”  Additionally, we consulted a board-
certified physician to verify our selection criteria. Based on this, we classified members 
as having a chronic condition if they reported having any of the following:  cancer, 
diabetes, heart disease, asthma, and anxiety or depression.  We define our chronic   12
household indicator as equal to one if at least one member in a household reported having 
at least one of these medical conditions.
3   
Human Capital and Demographic Measures: In our multivariate regression model 
of OOP spending, we include a set of control variables to capture demographic and 
human capital attributes of policyholder(s) in the household.  In households with two 
policyholders, we use the higher valued outcome.  We include the age of the policyholder 
(years); highest education (years); race (white, black, Asian/Pacific islander, other 
(reference category))
4; Hispanic; whether any household members are married; and the 
number of children in the household who are 17 years of age or younger.  We also 
include a quadratic for household’s annual income ($1,000s), inflation-adjusted to $2009.  
Since there may be geographic differences in insurance benefits, labor market conditions, 
and provider prices, we also include four region dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South, 
West (excluded)) and an indicator for whether the household resides in a metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA). 
Employer and Plan Characteristics:  Although the MEPS-HC does not contain a 
great amount of detail on the specific attributes of the plan(s) held by each household, it 
is possible to identify some basic information about their coverage in order to test 
whether any differences that we observe are due to these two populations being insured 
by different types of plans.  First, we constructed a binary measure for whether or not the 
household had a choice of plans.  This could occur in two ways – a worker in the 
household being offered more than one plan through his or her workplace or a household 
                                                 
3Households that have more generous health insurance may be more likely to seek medical care in which 
they will be diagnosed with a chronic condition, a possibility that might lead us to understate the 
differences in insurance generosity between chronically ill households and non-chronically ill households. 
4 We re-coded multi-race households to reflect the less prevalent race in the population.   13
in which both workers have an offer of employer sponsored insurance.  Second, we 
identified whether a household is enrolled in a plan that restricts coverage only to those 
providers in the plan’s network (e.g., exclusive provider organization).  Third, using the 
Person-Round-Plan file, we constructed a measure corresponding to the household’s 
annual OOP premium ($2009) for the health insurance plan(s) held during the year.
5  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample of households, reported separately 
for households with and without a chronically ill member.   
We also consider a set of characteristics that correspond to the policyholder’s 
employment that in turn, may be correlated with the characteristics of their coverage.
6  To 
capture the policyholder’s establishment size, we define a set of binary indicator 
variables corresponding to whether the policyholder is employed at a small establishment 
( 50 workers) or a private organization (versus a government organization), as well as 
whether the policyholder is a member of a union.  We use this information on plan and 
employment characteristics in our analysis of whether there is evidence that the 
chronically ill are in different types of plan than others. 
Methods: 
The first set of insurance curves that we present are the non-parametric and 
unadjusted estimates of the aggregate insurance curves for all households with a chronic 
illness and all households without a chronic illness depicted graphically.   We plot OOP 
spending against total spending for households with a chronic illness and for households 
                                                 
5 In the case of the household holding two plans, we sum each plan’s OOP premium to arrive at the 
household-level measure. 
6 A small percentage of households reports having two policyholders.  In this case, we defined the variable 
as equal to one if either of the policyholder’s had the particular attribute (e.g., worked for a small 
establishment, private organization, or belonged to a union).   14
without a chronic illness.  To construct these curves, we compute median OOP spending 
within total spending categories where the bins are defined at intervals of $250 for total 
spending between $0 and $5,000; $500 between $5,001 and $10,000; $2500 between 
$10,001 and $25,000; and one bin for $25,001-$50,000.  The progressively larger 
intervals reflect our desire to keep sample sizes sufficiently large across the spending 
distribution.  
Our next set of curves is comprised of predictions of OOP spending from 
parametric models of OOP spending as a function of total spending, chronic illness, and a 
set of controls.  We estimate the following parametric model: 
 OOPi = f(Ti, Ti*Chronic; Xi, Year; B) +i    
where  OOP is out-of-pocket spending, T is a quadratic in total spending, Chronic is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a chronic illness (defined above),  X is a set of 
human capital and demographic variables (defined above), and Year, which is a set of 
year indicator dummy variables (1997 as reference category).  B represents our 
parameters to be estimated.  We estimate this equation using median regression. All 
analyses are weighted to adjust for the complex design of the MEPS.
7   
Results 
Insurance Curves:  Households With and Without Chronic Conditions 
                                                 
7 Survey commands in STATA do not allow for explicit clustering to account for repeated observations on 
households, which is present given the overlapping panel design.  When we re-estimated the model without 
explicit survey commands but utilized analytic weights and allowed for clustering, the standard errors are 
almost identical.  Median regression is not supported by the survey commands.  In this case, we used 
analytic weights with clustering.  For robustness, we also considered alternative specifications including 
OLS regression and a square-root transformation.  These results produced qualitatively similar patterns of 
results and are available in an online appendix.   15
We present raw estimates of the insurance curves for chronically ill and non-chronically 
ill households in Figure 1.  Each point on the curve represents the median OOP spending 
level for households within that total spending bin. 
Median OOP spending is roughly the same for chronically ill households and for 
non-chronically ill households up to about $8,000 of total spending.  After this level of 
total spending
8, OOP spending is noticeably higher among chronically ill households, 
suggesting that chronically ill households have less generous insurance against high 
levels of expenditure than do households without a chronically ill member.  Using a non-
parametric test of the equality of medians for each bin of total spending, we assessed 
whether observed differences were statistically significant. At levels above $8,000, 
median spending for chronic and non-chronic households are significantly different for 
nine out of the eleven bins.  
  Our estimates of equation (1) using median regression show a similar story.  
Using an F-test, we reject the hypothesis that the parameters on the interaction terms of 
chronic with total spending and chronic with total spending squared are jointly equal to 
zero (p<.001).  Figure 2 plots our predicted OOP spending against total spending to 
illustrate these differences graphically.
9     
As the graph shows, the adjusted OOP spending of those households with chronic 
conditions is higher than for other households, with the difference widening at higher 
                                                 
8 Approximately 18% of households in the sample have annual total spending in excess of $8,000 per year. 
9 A full set of model results are available in an online appendix.   16
levels of total medical spending.  Thus, our findings illustrate that households with 
chronic conditions appear less generously insured than other households.
10   
 Are the Chronically Ill Enrolled in Different, Less Generous Plans? 
  While our method of comparing insurance curves can distinguish between 
different levels of insurance generosity by group, it cannot by itself distinguish between 
the competing explanations for those differences.  One possible explanation for 
generosity differences is that the two groups are enrolled in different types of plans.  This 
could occur, for example, if firms insuring households with chronic conditions respond to 
higher associated premiums by offering less generous plans to their employees.  Another 
possible explanation for these differences is that that there exist differences in how the 
same plans cover the types of services used by individuals with chronic versus non-
chronic conditions.  In this case, the two types of workers and any dependents need not 
be in different plans.  In order to shed light on what factors may be responsible for 
differences in the generosity of insurance that we observe for households with and 
without chronic conditions, we examine some additional characteristics of the coverage 
held by these households.   
  To investigate the hypothesis that individuals with and without chronic conditions 
are in different types of plans, we first look at characteristics of the health plan menu 
offered and the health plans held by the household’s policyholder(s).  We observe 
whether the household has a choice of plans (which is likely to be positively associated 
                                                 
10 The reader should keep in mind that there is substantial heterogeneity in the plans held within the two 
groups.  Our method aggregates across these plans and cannot speak to the frequency in which the 
individual plans held by the chronically ill are less generous, only to the average difference.  
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with generosity), whether or not the plan held is an HMO, and the out-of-pocket premium 
paid by the household.  We regressed each of these variables on the policyholder’s age, 
education, race and ethnicity, marital status and number of children in the household, 
household income, an MSA dummy, region dummies, as well as the chronic condition 
indicator.  A summary of unadjusted and adjusted values are provided in Table 2.  These 
model results suggest that households with a chronically ill member are 1.5 percentage 
points more likely to have a choice of plans relative to other households. This difference 
is small, given that 64 percent of households overall has a choice of plans.   We observe 
no statistically significant differences with respect to enrollment in an exclusive provider 
organization or with respect to the annual out-of-pocket premium for family coverage.  
Thus, our results do not suggest important differences in the types of plans in which the 
two populations are enrolled. 
  As a further check on the possibility that households with individuals who have a 
chronic condition are enrolled in different health plans than other households, we also 
examine whether there are differences between the policyholders of the two groups in 
terms of workplace or job characteristics that are known to be correlated with insurance 
generosity:  establishments with 50 or fewer workers, private sector establishments 
(versus government), and whether the worker is a union member.  We do this using 
multivariate regression and a summary of our results are also reported in Table 2.   
Controlling for the same set of explanatory variables as above, we find that 
households covering at least one member with a chronic condition are 2 percentage 
points less likely to obtain their coverage through a small establishment.  We also 
observe that households with a chronically ill member are slightly more likely to have a   18
policyholder that is a union member.  There is no significant difference by chronic status 
in the probability of working for a private firm (versus a government organization).  
While we do not have enough data on plan characteristics to definitively rule out 
differences in the types of plans in which these two groups are enrolled, our results 
indicate no evidence to support the claim that households that insure individuals with 
chronic conditions obtain their coverage from sources that tend to offer health plans of 
substantially different generosity relative to others.   If anything, the estimated 
relationships for the effect of chronic status on plan choice, establishment size, and union 
affiliation would seem to suggest that households with a chronically ill member might be 
covered by plans that are more generous (Gabel et al. 2006).   
How Different are the Services Used by the Chronically Ill? 
  The alternative reason we have suggested to explain why the insurance of the 
chronically ill is less generous for a given level of total spending is that insurance plans 
are structured in ways that favor the types of services consumed episodically as compared 
to the types of services consumed more persistently.  This explanation assumes that there 
are differences in the types of services consumed by these two groups.  To examine this, 
in Figure 3, we show plots of six types of service-specific spending against total 
spending.  
As expected, we find that service usage differs substantially for the chronically ill 
population as compared to the population of households not covering any chronic 
conditions.  We find that, for any given level of total medical spending, households with 
chronic conditions spend substantially more on prescription drugs than other households   19
and that this difference is statistically significant.  For example, for households with total 
spending between $4,750 and $5,000, households covering a chronic condition spend 
almost 76 percent more on prescription drugs, on average, than other households ($879 
versus $1,548).  For households spending $12,500-$15,000, the difference is even greater 
($1,634 versus $3,202).  For a given level of total spending, households not covering 
someone with a chronic condition spend equal or more on other services including office-
based visits, outpatient care, inpatient services, emergency room charges, and dental care.  
While it is not surprising that the services required and demanded by households with 
chronic conditions differ from those demanded by other households, such differences in 
services consumed may, given the structure of insurance policies, produce differences in 
the overall level of insurance provided to these two populations.
11   
Do Differences in Services Used Explain Why Chronically Ill Households Are Less 
Generously Insured? 
In Figure 4, we present graphs of the average coinsurance rates for various types 
of covered services for given levels of total spending.  Average coinsurance is calculated 
for each total spending bin separately for each service.  For example, for office based 
visits, we divide OOP spending on office-based visits by total spending on office based 
visits for each household with positive spending on office-based visits.  We then average 
over all households within a category of overall total spending to generate our estimate.  
                                                 
11 One might also want to consider longer-term or "lifetime" insurance curves that relate many years or 
lifetime OOP spending to total spending.  The data we use (the MEPS) preclude our constructing these 
longer-term or lifetime measures.  We suspect, however, that there is greater serial correlation in 
expenditures among the chronically ill than among those with acute conditions (almost by definition). 
 Thus, a longer-term picture using our method would tend to show an even larger difference in the 
generosity of insurance between the chronically ill and the non-chronically ill. 
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Thus, our estimate of the co-insurance rate is the average of the ratio of category-specific 
OOP spending to category-specific total spending (as opposed to the ratio of the 
averages).   These coinsurance rates vary with total spending, as one would expect, 
because they depend upon factors such as whether a household has met its deductible.  
These calculations also depend on the timing of services. For example, some households 
may have consumed outpatient services while still subject to a deductible while others 
have already met the deductible or did not have a deductible as part of their policy.  We 
expect such differences to average out over the population and expect that differences in 
the average coinsurance rate for each service may provide a strong indication of the 
reason that we find that chronically ill are less generously insured than other households.   
We see from Figure 4 that in most cases average coinsurance rates do not differ 
substantially within category for households with a chronically ill member as compared 
to others.  The only noticeable difference in average coinsurance for the two groups 
occurs for prescription drugs.  Average prescription drug coinsurance is higher for the 
non-chronic households than for those covering a chronically ill member. This lends 
support to our earlier conclusion that differences in plans cannot explain why non-chronic 
households are more generously insured on average than households covering a chronic 
condition since the only real difference in coinsurance rates favors the chronically ill. 
Looking across the panels of Figure 4, it is apparent that average coinsurance 
rates for prescription drugs are high relative to other healthcare services. Figure 5 
presents coinsurance rates for each service type for three levels of overall total spending, 
$1,750-$2,000, $9,500-$10,000, and $15,000-$17,500.  The differences between 
prescription drug coinsurance and coinsurance for other types of services is striking.  For   21
example, for households with total spending between $1,750 and $2,000, average 
coinsurance for prescription drugs is approximately 46 percent.  In contrast, the average 
coinsurance for outpatient services is approximately 17 percent, emergency room 18-21 
percent, office-based services 27 percent, and dental care 34-37 percent.  With the 
exception of a higher coinsurance rate for dental care, the pattern is the same when we 
look at total spending levels of $9,500-$10,000 in panel B of Figure 5 and at spending 
levels of $15,000-$17,500 in panel C. 
The patterns documented in Figure 4 and 5 explain how it is that chronically ill 
households are less generously insured despite our finding no evidence that they are in 
different, less generous health plans than households not covering a person with a chronic 
condition.  For a given level of total spending, the chronically ill consume a much higher 
proportion of prescription drugs than do other households.  Prescription drugs are insured 
substantially less generously than other health care services.  The prevalence of insurance 
designs with higher coinsurance for prescription drugs results in less generous insurance 
for the chronically ill as compared to others with the same level of total medical 
expenditures. 
Conclusions 
  This paper uses a novel approach -- what we term “insurance curves” -- to assess 
the relative generosity of the insurance plans held by various populations.  We find 
evidence that households with a chronically ill member are less well insured than other 
households.  In particular, both our raw unadjusted and parametric estimates of the 
insurance curves for chronically ill households and for non-chronically ill households   22
show that OOP spending is greater among chronically ill households at higher levels of 
total spending than among non-chronically ill households.   
  Households with a chronically ill member may have less generous insurance 
either because they are enrolled in less generous plans than the plans of other households 
or because insurance plans in general tend to have greater co-insurance or less coverage 
for “steady” expenditures or for expenditures on items such as prescription drugs as 
opposed to expenditures on acute episodes such as inpatient stays.  Our analysis suggests 
that it is benefit design, not differences in the types of plans covering the two groups, that 
explains the difference we observe in insurance generosity.  Specifically, we find that it is 
greater coinsurance for prescription drugs, controlling for total healthcare spending that 
appears to be responsible for the less generous coverage of the chronically ill.  That is, 
the specific services used most by the chronically ill – prescription drugs—are, by design, 
reimbursed at a lower rate.  This is not due to the higher overall expenditures on average 
of the chronically ill, since we control for total spending in all of our analyses. 
  Our findings have important policy and health implications.  Insurance designs 
favoring acute care over chronic care may be based on the fact that chronic needs such as 
prescription drugs are more predictable and therefore the coverage of such expenses does 
not serve as pure insurance.  However, this reasoning has some potential flaws.  First, 
insurance design given a chronic condition ignores the insurance problem associated with 
provision of insurance against developing a chronic condition.  Even ignoring that thorny 
problem, policymakers concerned about health outcomes as well as cost control may look 
to recent evidence on coinsurance as an obstacle to medication adherence and question 
whether it is desirable to deter those with chronic conditions from taking needed   23
medications.  Additionally, some recent work showing that health care cost savings 
generated by lower medication adherence lead to higher spending on other services such 
as inpatient and outpatient care suggests the possibility that higher coinsurance for this 
group could lead to increases in overall healthcare costs.  Our evidence shows that the 
insurance of the chronically ill is less generous insurance and suggests this is primarily 
due to higher coinsurance for prescription drugs than for other services.  The weight of 
the evidence suggests that the current standard in insurance design of higher coinsurance 
for prescription drugs is worth reassessing. 
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Household OOP spending ($2009)  814  1234  1719  21 
Household total spending ($2009)  3580  7163  9300  161 
Age of policyholder (years)  39.781  10.921  44.972  0.112 
Education of policyholder (years)  14.052  2.371  14.054  0.030 
White  0.808  0.394  0.872  0.005 
Black  0.127  0.332  0.085  0.004 
Asian  0.053  0.224  0.027  0.002 
Other race  0.013  0.112  0.016  0.001 
Hispanic  0.089  0.285  0.072  0.003 
Married  0.449  0.497  0.650  0.006 
Number of children  0.580  1.008  0.744  0.012 
Household total income (1000s; $2009)  77.565  58.158  86.524  0.743 
Metropolitan statistical area  0.852  0.355  0.838  0.009 
Northeast  0.213  0.409  0.200  0.013 
Midwest  0.247  0.431  0.254  0.011 
South  0.332  0.471  0.327  0.012 
Plan Selection and Access Variables 
Small establishment (< 50 employees)  0.380  0.485  0.364  0.005 
Private organization  0.761  0.427  0.734  0.005 
Union member  0.203  0.402  0.236  0.005 
Household has a choice of plans  0.621  0.485  0.669  0.005 
Household enrolled in an exclusive 
provider organization  0.194  0.395  0.212  0.006 
OOP premium (singles; $2009)  502  15  478  18 
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choice of plans  0.621  0.669  0.048**  0.0152* 
Proportion of Households holding an 
EPO  0.194  0.212  0.018**  0.0041 
Average Annual OOP Premium  
(Single person household)  $502  $478  ‐24  ‐54* 
Average Annual OOP Premium 
 (Multi‐person household)  $1222  $1230  8  ‐$25 
Proportion of Households in which 
policyholder employed at small 
establishment  0.38  0.364  ‐0.016**  ‐0.0214** 
Proportion of Households in which 
policyholder employed at private 
organization  0.761  0.734  ‐0.027**  ‐0.0033 
Proportion of Households in which 





proportions denoted by **p<.01, *p<.05          
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Figure 2:  Predicted Out-of-Pocket Spending across the Total Spending 
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Figure 4: Average Service-Specific Coinsurance Rate by Overall Total Spending ($1000s), 









































Figure 5:  Average Coinsurance across Service-Specific Categories for Three Total 
Spending Levels 
 